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CALENDARING 
Appellee, Video Publishing Ventures, Inc., (hereinafter 
"VPV")/ claims that oral argument and a published opinion is not 
necessary because the trial court's rulings were fact sensitive and 
should therefore be summarily affirmed. VPV, however, does not 
apply the appropriate criteria. The appropriate criteria is 
whether this court's ruling would contribute to Utah's body of 
caselaw by making new law. 
Whether this court accepts oral argument and issues an 
published opinion depends on whether this court upholds or reverses 
the trial court's ruling. Since the trial court departed from 
established case law at several points in its rulings, in order for 
this court to uphold the trial court's rulings, this court would 
need to either depart from or modify existing caselaw. Such a 
departure or modification would result in new caselaw which would 
need to be published. 
If, on the other hand, this court merely applies existing case 
law to the basic facts as found by the trial court, it will 
necessarily reverse the trial court, but may do so without oral 
argument in an unpublished opinion. 
MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE 
VPV claims that Appellant's, Stan Hartmark (hereinafter 
"Hartmark"), entire appeal involves challenges to the trial court's 
factual findings, and should be dismissed for failure to marshal 
the evidence. VPV's request is without merit because Hartmark is 
not challenging basic factual findings which would require 
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marshaling. The challenges raised by Hartmark involve the trial 
court's disregard of applicable law or misapplication of the law in 
reaching its ultimate findings or conclusions. Such issues are 
legal in nature. 
VPV has made the common mistake of confusing the trial court's 
ultimate conclusions arrived at by applying the law to the basic 
facts and the trial court's basic findings of fact regarding what 
actually happened. The marshaling requirement only applies when 
challenging basic facts. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Hartmark is not seeking to overturn the trial court's basic 
factual findings regarding what happened. Hartmark is seeking 
review of the trial court's legal conclusions and application of 
the law to those facts in reaching its ultimate conclusions. Since 
Hartmark is challenging the trial court's legal conclusions and 
applications of the law to the facts, not the trial court's 
findings of basic fact, marshaling is not required, nor would it 
even prove helpful. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
VPV makes the same mistake involving the appropriate standard 
of review. VPV erroneously assumes that the trial court's ultimate 
conclusions, such as its "finding" that there was a lack of a 
meeting of the minds or a lack of adequate consideration, are basic 
factual findings to be reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. 
Such "findings" are not factual. Rather, they are legal 
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conclusions in that they are the ultimate conclusion reached by 
applying the law to the basic underlying facts. 
If the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the law, there 
is no reason to give it the same deference that is given when the 
trial court makes factual determinations based on the credibility 
of the witnesses. The ultimate legal CDnclusions are based on 
analysis, not courtroom observations. Consequently, the appellate 
court is free to correct the trial court's ultimate legal 
conclusions if the trial court has ignored, misinterpreted, or 
misapplied the caselaw in reaching such conclusions. Interwest 
Construction v. Palmer. 886 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1994). 
Since each issue raised by Hartmark involves an erroneous 
legal ruling or misapplication of the law to the facts, the 
appropriate standard of review is a correction of error. 
VPV's claim that the trial court's ultimate rulings are 
factual findings deserving deference is a smokescreen to cover the 
trial court's analytical errors. As each challenge raised by 
Hartmark is revisited below, the legal mistake or analytical error 
made by the trial court will be clearly identified so as to confirm 
that this court is being called upon to correct the trial court's 
analytical and legal errors, not its basic factual findings. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE GENERAL RELEASE WAS 
UNENFORCEABLE, WAS AN IMPROPER LEGAL CONCLUSION AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
The first issue raised by Hartmark is that the trial court 
erroneously concluded that the general release was unenforceable 
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because there was no meeting of the minds. The conclusion that 
there was no "meeting of the minds" is an ultimate legal 
conclusion. The trial court's analysis in reaching that conclusion 
in this case is patently flawed.1 
This court recently held in Hilton Hotel and Pacific Reliance 
Insurance v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Case No. 940594-CA 
(Utah App. 1995) , that a sua sponte ruling from the bench is 
inappropriate. This court specifically stated: 
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties 
is inappropriate and outside of the discretion 
given the governing tribunal because it 
encroaches upon the advocate responsibility 
conferred upon counsel . . . Furthermore, if a 
party fails to raise an issue and present 
evidence regarding the same, it has waived the 
right to do so . . . Thus, '[t]he interest of 
justice are not enhanced when the court 
exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out 
and deciding an issue that would otherwise be 
dead, it not having been litigated at the time 
of trial.' Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1983)). 
Hilton, at 6. 
This court ruled, within the past two (2) weeks, that it was 
improper for a trial court to raise and decide an issue sua sponte 
when it was never expressed or implied by the party as part of the 
l
. VPV takes exception to Hartmark's assertion that the trial 
court raised the meeting of the minds issue sua sponte by citing 
this court to nineteen pages of transcript. A review of those 
nineteen pages will show that VPV never raised a "meeting of the 
minds" challenge. The issue was never addressed until the trial 
court raised it itself in its ruling. The fact that the trial 
court dismissed Hartmark's argument sua sponte was inappropriate 
does not invalidate Hartmark's argument. There is no disputing 
that the trial court impermissibly raised the meeting of the minds 
argument on its own initiative. 
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party's theory of their case. Hilton, at 7. Since this issue was 
very recently decided by this Court, further discussion on the 
point would certainly be redundant. 
The trial court ruled that there was not a meeting of the 
minds because the parties took two positions at trial which the 
court deemed were "different". The court considered the 
"different" positions to be proof that there was not a meeting of 
the minds at the time the release was signed. In reality, the 
trial court was comparing apples and oranges. It was comparing 
VPV's factual claim with Hartmark's legal argument. 
VPV had claimed, and the trial court so found, that VPV signed 
the release in order to get the company checkbook from Hartmark.2 
The trial court also found that obtaining the financial records was 
the "main motivation" for VPV signing the release. The trial court 
then addressed Hartmark's legal argument that, regardless of VPV's 
motivation, the release was binding because the mutual releases, in 
and of themselves, constituted adequate consideration. 
The trial court then concluded: "With those two positions it 
seemed very apparent that there was not a meeting of the minds as 
2
. Whether or not Hartmark demanded the release in exchange 
for the checkbook was in dispute at trial. No testimony was ever 
given that Hartmark in fact demanded the release. The only 
testimony given was hearsay that the attorney, Ron Vance, had told 
VPV officers that Hartmark wanted a release before he would 
surrender the financial records. 
Despite the sparsity of the evidence, the trial court found 
that Hartmark had refused to surrender the records until he 
received a general release. This underlying factual finding is not 
being challenged, rather, it is being accepted for purposes of 
argument because even if it is true, it does not, under Utah law, 
invalidate the general release. 
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to what was contemplated by the release, what consideration was 
given." 
The trial court's conclusion was a non sequiter. It does not 
logically follow that there was not a meeting of the minds at the 
time the release was signed simply because Hartmark subsequently 
raised a legal argument at trial in order to negate the relevance 
of VPV's factual claims. Hartmark argued at trial that even if 
VPV's main motivation in signing the release was to obtain the 
checkbook, such a motivation did not alter the fact that the 
parties also gave mutual releases which, in and of themselves, 
constituted adequate consideration. 
In order for the trial court to have correctly held that there 
was no meeting of the minds, it should have, but did not, base its 
conclusion on the frame of mind of each party at the time they 
entered into the agreement.3 The trial court's analysis is, 
therefore, analytically flawed and should be corrected by this 
court. 
When one considers the frame of mind of each party based on 
the trial court's underlying factual findings, i.e., that Hartmark 
demanded the release in exchange for the records, that VPV entered 
into the release in part to obtain the records, and that Hartmark 
surrendered the records after obtaining the release, only one 
3
. Hartmark was arguing that even if VPV's factual claims were 
true regarding the records, they did not affect the validity of the 
release because the mutual releases provided the necessary 
consideration and nothing in VPV's factual claims negated that 
mutual consideration. 
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conclusion can be reached: The parties were, in fact, in agreement 
as to what was contemplated and what consideration was being given. 
There is no dispute given the trial court's findings. Both 
parties expected, as part of entering into the Release Agreement, 
the transfer of the records and the signing of the general release 
by the other party. Consequently, there is only one conclusion 
which may be logically reached based upon the trial court's factual 
findings: There was, at the time the documents were signed, a 
meeting of the minds. 
Since there is only one logical conclusion, the trial court's 
illogical conclusion should be corrected by this court. This court 
should reverse the trial court's ruling that the release was 
invalid for a failure of a meeting of the minds. To leave the 
trial court's ruling in place would allow VPV to have the full 
benefit of the bargain it sought, while denying Hartmark the 
protection of the release for which he has paid the agreed upon 
price. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO 
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE IS CONTRARY TO WELL-SETTLED 
CASE LAW IN UTAH. 
The trial court's holding that there was inadequate 
consideration for the general release is a legal evaluation of the 
consideration given and is, therefore, subject to correction by 
this court. The trial court erred in its legal conclusion that the 
mutual releases were not adequate consideration to make the release 
enforceable. 
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The only pertinent underlying facts are: That both parties 
signed a general release which mutually released the other from any 
and all claims arising out of Hartmark's employment as an officer 
of VPV; and that VPV's main motivation in signing the release was 
to obtain the financial records. Hartmark is not raising any 
challenge to either of these facts. He is only raising a challenge 
as to the trial court's legal conclusion as to the impact of the 
second fact on the first fact. 
Hartmark claims that VPV's "main motivation" is legally 
irrelevant to whether there was consideration given. Even if VPV's 
main motivation was to obtain the records, it still received 
Hartmark's binding promise to not bring any legal action against 
VPV. This is, under Utah law, all that is needed as consideration 
for VPV's promise not to bring suit against Hartmark. Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613, 237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951). 
The trial court did not cite any legal precedent for its 
ruling that an ulterior motive negates the express consideration 
provided in the contract, nor has VPV provided any caselaw to 
support the trial court.4 VPV appears to concede that the mutual 
promises are adequate consideration, whatever the motivations may 
have been. 
Since, as a matter of law, there was adequate consideration 
for VPV's release of all claims against Hartmark, regardless of any 
Nor does the trial court justify its violation of the 
parole evidence rule by looking to evidence outside the contract 
itself to determine the consideration being given. 
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ulterior motive, the trial court's contrary ruling must be 
reversed. 
Since there was a meeting of the minds as to what was 
contemplated and what consideration was given, and since there was 
adequate consideration given in the form of mutual promises, there 
is no legal reason that the general release should not have been 
enforced and VPV's claims dismissed. 
III. APPELLEE CANNOT ASK THIS COURT TO MAKE A RULING BASED UPON 
FACTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT NEVER FOUND. 
Recognizing the flawed ruling below, VPV argues that this 
court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the release was 
invalid on grounds other than the grounds used by the trial court. 
In particular, VPV argues that the release should be ruled invalid 
under theories of duress, fraud, and wrongful concealment. 
VPV is asking this court to make rulings the trial court never 
made based upon facts the trial court never found. Such a request 
must be denied if the appropriate roles of the trial court and the 
appellate court are to be preserved. 
VPV misconstrues the doctrine that an appellate court may 
"affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the 
trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling." 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
This doctrine does not extend to allowing the appellate court to 
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make factual findings on disputed facts which the trial court has 
not made itself.5 
The trial court clearly limited its ruling to the legal 
theories that no contract was ever formed, i.e. failure of the 
meeting of the minds and lack of adequate consideration. The trial 
court hinted that it could have invalidated the release on a theory 
of duress, but refused to do so.6 Further, it made no indication 
that it would have even considered invalidating the release on a 
theory that Hartmark had schemed to defraud VPV or had wrongfully 
concealed facts from VPV. For this court to make such rulings for 
the first time on appeal would be a gross injustice to Hartmark. 
In order for this doctrine to be applied in this case, this 
court must first make basic factual findings which the trial court 
did not make. It is axiomatic that a trial court's ruling must be 
supported by factual findings, particularly when the evidence is in 
dispute. Without such findings, a trial court's ruling must be 
reversed. Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994) . In this 
case, not only did the trial court not rule on these theories, it 
did not make any factual findings that could support such rulings. 
For example, the Supreme Court in Buehner affirmed the 
trial court's ruling because this court viewed the trial court as 
having erred in construing the parties' agreement, but concluded 
that paragraph 9 of the Construction Commitment Letter did not 
impose a duty on Home, and, therefore, the judgment in favor of 
Home was affirmed. 
6
. The trial court's hesitance was admittedly caused by the 
inconsistency of such a ruling with existing Utah caselaw which 
prevents VPV from claiming economic duress. This legal limitation 
will be fully discussed in the next section. 
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All of VPV's theories involved numerous disputed facts. 
Without basic factual findings by the trial court concerning what 
happened, including what was said, by whom, to whom, when, etc., 
there are no factual findings upon which this court could, for the 
first time, find that Hartmark committed duress, schemed to defraud 
VPV, or wrongfully concealed facts from VPV. 
This is particularly true when one recognizes that a key fact 
in each of VPV's theories is Hartmark's subjective intent. This 
court simply cannot make findings about Hartmark's subjective 
intent from a cold record containing numerous factual disputes. 
This court cannot determine which of the many versions of the facts 
it should believe. It has not observed the witnesses, heard the 
explanations, nor weighed the conflicting testimony.7 Nor can this 
VPV has not even gone to the trouble of identifying the 
elements of its various theories and the pertinent evidence to show 
that they were proven at trial. Apparently VPV not only wants this 
court to do the work of the trial court, it also wants this court 
to do VPV's work. All VPV has done is set out miscellaneous 
testimony in an attempt to show that Hartmark was a "bad person," 
and even that is inaccurately portrayed. 
On page 14 of Appellee's brief Hartmark states "Hartmark 
disappeared from the scene and took the checkbooks and financial 
records with him." Trans. 117-21. The Brief also asserts that 
Hartmark withheld the records from VPV until it signed a release. 
There was never any direct evidence that Hartmark in fact had the 
records or was refusing to surrender them without a release. 
Hartmark's uncontradicted testimony was that he had left the 
checkbook and records with various people at VPV, and VPV simply 
could not find them because they were lost or misplaced. The only 
evidence that Hartmark was withholding the checkbook until he 
received a release were hearsay statements made by VPV's attorney 
Ron Vance to that effect. The conclusion that Hartmark had 
actually taken the records was pure speculation on the part of the 
officers of VPV. In fact, contrary to Appellee's assertion that 
the checkbook "mysteriously appeared," the checkbook and records 
were retrieved from VPV's attorney's office immediately after the 
signing, not from Hartmark. 
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court imply such factual findings, when the trial court has not at 
least made the ultimate conclusions sought by VPV. State v. 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994). 
Furthermore, this court should not imply any factual findings 
when Hartmark specifically objected to the trial court's lack of 
adequate findings below, and VPV argued below that the findings 
were sufficient. VPV must be deemed to have waived any argument 
that factual findings should now be implied, since it has expressly 
argued that the findings were adequate.8 
The representation that the terms of the release were not 
negotiated is patently false since the release was in fact drafted 
by VPV's attorney. Inasmuch as VPV's attorney was acting as VPV's 
agent, it is impossible to say that the terms of the release were 
not bargained for nor negotiated. At best, VPV may have a claim 
against its attorney for doing a poor job, but it cannot claim that 
the job was never done. 
Finally, VPV claims, on page 14 of its brief, that the only 
consideration given for the release was the return of the records 
which belonged to VPV. Not only is this a legal conclusion instead 
of a fact, it is erroneous. The mutual releases were also given as 
consideration. 
Even if all of these facts were accepted as true, which they 
should not be since they were contested and no findings were made 
by the trial court, they do not require a finding of a scheme to 
defraud, or wrongful concealment, or duress. Even if Hartmark kept 
the records until he obtained a release and resigned, such action 
would be prudent by a financial officer. Hartmark had every right 
to retain those records until he resigned since he was still the 
financial officer of VPV. His reluctance to surrender the records 
before he resigned does not prove ill intent. These "facts" simply 
do not justify this court invalidating the release on such grounds 
on its own initiative. 
8
. It would be extremely poor precedent to allow a party to 
claim at trial that the findings are adequate and then allow the 
party to ask the Appellate Court to fill in the blanks. VPV's 
approach amounts to invited error which has consistently been ruled 
to be a waiver of any defect. State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1992) . VPV should therefore be bound to only those findings and 
conclusions expressly made by the trial court. 
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Inasmuch as the trial court did not find that Hartmark 
obtained the release under duress, as part of a scheme to defraud, 
or following wrongful concealment, the trial court did not even 
make basic factual findings to support such conclusions. This 
court should not assume the role of the trial court by making such 
factual findings and rulings now for the first time on appeal. 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987). 
IV. ECONOMIC DURESS IS NOT A VALID DEFENSE TO A RELEASE OF CLAIMS. 
Even if the trial court had expressly ruled that the release 
was invalid because of economic duress, such a ruling should be 
reversed by this court for being contrary to established caselaw. 
Utah does not recognize economic duress as a defense to a release 
of claims. 
VPV has been less than candid with this court on this point. 
VPV quotes Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 754 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that !I[t]o constitute legal 
duress, defendant must have acted against his will, and had no 
other viable alternative." What VPV fails to tell this court is 
that the Supreme Court in Horgan expressly held that economic 
duress is not a legal defense to a release of claims in Utah. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
. Nor is plaintiff's claimed financial need an 
adequate defense to the release. 'The mere fact that a 
contract is entered into under stress or pecuniary 
necessity is insufficient [to constitute duress]' . . . 
Many releases are negotiated and signed out of economic 
necessity: to adopt plaintiff's argument would therefore 
invite the avoidance of many good faith settlements. 
Horgan, at 754. 
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Consequently, even if the trial court had expressly "found" 
that the release was entered into under duress, such duress would 
have been purely economic and, therefore, inconsequential as a 
matter of law. Even if the efforts by Hartmark to protect himself 
were deemed "duress," as claimed by VPV, since the duress would 
only be economic, the release would not be rendered unenforceable. 
Even if this court were willing to overturn the Supreme Court 
and allow economic duress to invalidate a release, this would not 
be the appropriate case. As the Supreme Court noted in its general 
discussion of duress, a party must have "no other viable 
alternative." Horcran, at 754. VPV, in this case, had a very 
simple alternative. It had approximately 10 days, during which 
time it could have asked a court to order Hartmark to turn over the 
checkbook, or to order the bank to allow an officer of VPV access 
to VPV's account so as to order stop-payments on all outstanding 
checks and to make the necessary payments to keep its doors opens. 
The facts of this case are quite similar to the facts of 
Horgan. The plaintiff had entered into a general release, and 
then, some time later, decided to bring an action in spite of the 
release. As the Supreme Court noted: "The mere fact of an 
improvident or bad bargain or a feeling of latent discontent is not 
a sufficient basis to avoid the effect of an otherwise valid 
release." Horgan, at 754. In this case, VPV willingly entered 
into a release because they thought it was the best method to 
resolve the disputes existing between the parties. Once they got 
what they wanted, they regretted the business decision they made, 
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and now seek to renege on their agreement. This court is not here 
to give VPV relief from the benefit of its own bargain. Id. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING THAT HARTMARK 
BENEFITTED FROM A CHECK MADE PAYABLE TO SIG SCHREYER FROM VPV. 
When the trial court ruled that Hartmark had breached his 
fiduciary duty by writing a check from VPV to Sig Schreyer, the 
trial court failed to make any factual finding that Hartmark had 
personally benefitted from such a check. Without a factual finding 
that Hartmark benefitted from the check, the trial court's 
conclusion that Hartmark breached his fiduciary duty is not 
supported by the findings and must be reversed. State v. Lovegren, 
798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990).9 
It appears that VPV is requesting that this court 
retroactively imply a factual finding of personal benefit. As 
indicated previously, it would be improper to imply any factual 
findings in this case, especially when VPV affirmatively argued 
below that the findings were adequate. 
Furthermore, there is no indication in the trial court's 
ruling that it recognized the necessity of finding a personal 
benefit before finding a breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, the 
trial court merely held that the check was "an unauthorized 
9
. This discussion is not needed if this court determines that 
the settlement between VPV and Schreyer constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction of the claim for recovery of the $10,370. Since VPV 
accepted $4,000 from Schreyer who actually received the money at 
issue, the debt should be deemed satisfied in full and any 
secondary liability of Hartmark forgiven. It appears that since 
VPV did not even raise an argument on this point in its brief that 
it has conceded the point. The judgment as it relates to the 
Schreyer check should therefore be reversed. 
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transfer of funds." Court's ruling, 6. Simply finding that 
Hartmark made an unauthorized transfer is not a finding that he did 
so for personal gain, or that to do so was a breach of a fiduciary 
duty. At best, it shows that the trial court believed Hartmark 
made a transfer that he should not have made. 
To hold, as the trial court did, that an unauthorized 
transfer, in and of itself, is a breach of a fiduciary duty, would 
be to adopt a rule of law so broad that it would cover every good 
faith mistaken payment. It is clear that some personal gain must 
be proven before an "unauthorized transfer" will amount to a breach 
of fiduciary duty. Mere error in judgment is not enough. 
In seeking to imply a factual finding of personal benefit, VPV 
claims that the evidence supporting the court's "factual finding"10 
is overwhelming. VPV then recites a litany of irrelevant facts 
which do not prove that Hartmark breached his fiduciary duty by 
personally benefitting from the check to Schreyer. The only 
possibly relevant "evidence" is an affidavit from Schreyer, who 
could not appear because of illness, wherein Schreyer states that 
Hartmark had personally guaranteed repayment of the loan from 
Schreyer to Echochem. In violation of the "best evidence" rule, no 
copy of any such personal guaranty was ever presented by VPV. In 
10
. Once again, VPV mischaracterizes the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion as a factual finding. Whether Hartmark 
breached his fiduciary duty is a legal conclusion made based upon 
the underlying facts. Hartmark is claiming that the trial court 
erred in making that conclusion without first finding that Hartmark 
received a personal benefit from the check. This is not a factual 
error but a legal error in concluding that a breach of fiduciary 
duty does not require personal benefit. Consequently, a correction 
of error standard of review applies. 
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fact, the note from VPV to Echochem, which was admitted into 
evidence, clearly indicated that Hartmark signed as an officer of 
Echochem and not individually. P. Ex. 2. 
In contradiction to VPV's assertion of misconduct was the 
uncontroverted testimony from Hartmark, Gardner (a director of 
VPV) , and Vance (VPV's legal counsel) that Hartmark met with Vance 
and sought his legal advice before issuing the check, and that 
Vance authorized the payment since VPV owed money to Echochem. 
Vance himself indicated that there was nothing illegal about the 
payment, only that it was sloppy accounting procedure. 
Given VPV's waiver of any need for an implied factual finding, 
and the lack of any indication in the trial court's ruling that it 
found Hartmark had benefitted personally, the absence of any 
reliable admissible evidence that Hartmark benefitted personally 
from the check, and the clear, uncontroverted evidence that the 
payment was made with the knowledge and consent of VPV's legal 
counsel, this court should not imply a finding that Hartmark 
personally benefitted from the check to Schreyer. 
Consequently, the court's ruling that Hartmark breached his 
fiduciary duty must be reversed for lack of adequate findings. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE $10,000 CHECK ISSUED 
TO HARTMARK#S ACCOUNT WAS NOT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES. 
The trial court refused to accept Hartmark's claim that the 
$10,000 check issued to his California account was for 
reimbursement of his expenses and compensation for 19 88 when 
setting up VPV. The court stated that there was "no competent 
evidence" as to the nature of the expenses. If the trial court 
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made its ruling after concluding that there was no competent 
evidence as to the nature of expenses, the trial court's ruling is 
inaccurate and, therefore, erroneous on its face. 
Hartmark is not challenging a factual finding that Hartmark 
was not entitled to the 1988 compensation and reimbursement, 
because no such factual finding was ever made. Rather, the trial 
court erroneously stated that since there was no competent evidence 
as to the nature of the expenses, such expenses must not have been 
for reimbursement of expenses. Such an error in analysis may be 
freely corrected by this court. 
To the extent the trial court may have intended to say that 
the evidence was insufficient to persuade the court because it did 
not show the nature of all of the 1988 expenses, Hartmark did not 
need to prove every expense so as to total $10,000. Hartmark only 
needed to prove the total sum. 
The amount owed from VPV to Hartmark had already been agreed 
upon by the officers of VPV. Hartmark7 s claims for 1988 
reimbursement and compensation had already been presented to VPV, 
and an accord and satisfaction had been reached regarding those 
claims. That accord and satisfaction was evidenced by the 
memorandum setting forth the amounts each officer was to receive. 
D. Ex. 22. 
Once the accord and satisfaction was reached, all Hartmark 
needed to prove was the agreed upon amount recorded on the 
memorandum. Since the memorandum was admitted into evidence, the 
trial court had sufficient competent evidence to prove that the 
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amount claimed was, in fact, owed to Hartmark. To hold that 
Hartmark needed to prove the nature of each expense before he could 
claim them violated the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, which 
was a legal error. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF FAIR MARKET VALUE ON 
THE PORTABLE TELEPHONE. 
Whether the trial court applied the appropriate measure of 
damages for conversion of the portable telephone is a legal 
question of the proper formula for damages. The case law 
unequivocally states that the appropriate formula, as a matter of 
law, is the fair market value at the time of the conversion. If 
the trial court used a different method of calculating damages, it 
has made a legal error which this court may correct. 
Hartmark is not claiming that the trial court erred in finding 
a fair market value of $1,000. That would be a factual challenge. 
Hartmark is claiming that the trial court erred in not finding the 
fair market value at all. Martell testified that VPV purchased the 
telephone for $1,000, but there was no evidence as to what the 
telephone was worth at the time of the conversion. The trial court 
awarded the purchase price, less the value of the phone at the time 
of trial, contrary to the law. 
Since VPV did not provide any evidence as to the fair market 
value at the time of the conversion, any attempt to set a fair 
market value would be pure speculation, which is not allowed. 
Henderson v. For-Shor Company, 757 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1988) . 
Since VPV had the burden of proving fair market value, and it 
failed to do so, it failed to prove its damages and, therefore, is 
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not entitled to damages or a reduction. Connell v. Tooele City, 
572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
VIII. WITHOUT A FINDING THAT A MOTION WAS FRIVOLOUSLY MADE, 
ATTORNEY'S FEES CANNOT BE AWARDED. 
In order for the trial court to lawfully award attorney's fees 
for a frivolous motion, it must first find that the motion was made 
without merit. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987). 
Judge Daniels never made such a finding, nor did Judge Iwasaki. 
Without such a preliminary finding, the trial court could not find 
that VPV was entitled to attorneys fees. Without a finding of 
entitlement to fees, any award of fees is erroneous as a matter of 
law. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) . 
Once again, VPV is seeking an implied finding that the motion 
was frivolous. As argued before, VPV should not be allowed to 
salvage the faulty judgment by seeking implied findings, since VPV 
argued below that the findings were adequate. Furthermore, there 
is not a sufficient manifestation that either Judge Daniels or 
Judge Iwasaki ever actually found that the motion was frivolous. 
The comment by Judge Daniels that the "request for attorney's 
fees will be taken under advisement and handled at a later time, 
depending on the merits of the underlying claim as to whether the 
corporation was properly authorized to file this suit," shows only 
that he had not made the requisite finding of frivolity at that 
time, and would not do so unless Hartmark's claim failed on the 
merits. 
VPV erroneously claims that since Hartmark's motion 
subsequently failed on the merits, that it is automatically 
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entitled to attorney's fees under Judge Daniels' statement. The 
failure of Hartmark's motion, however, was merely a precondition, 
not the determining factor. Unless the motion failed on the 
merits, there obviously could not be any cLaim for attorney's fees. 
But mere failure of Hartmark's motion is not enough to show that 
Judge Daniels actually found the motion frivolous, because it does 
not logically follow that because Hartmark's motion failed, that it 
was frivolous. O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 309. Since the motion was not 
decided on the merits until after Judge Daniels had retired, there 
is no logical way that a finding of frivolity can be implied to 
him. 
Judge Iwasaki gave no indication that he personally had 
evaluated the motion and determined that it was frivolous. In 
fact, given VPV's representation to Judge Iwasaki that Judge 
Daniels had already determined that attorney's fees would be 
awarded if the motion was unsuccessful, it is unlikely that Judge 
Iwasaki ever gave the matter any independent thought. There is 
certainly no indication in the record that Judge Iwasaki personally 
found the motion to be frivolous. 
Since there is no reliable indication that the trial court 
actually made the requisite finding that the motion was frivolous, 
no such finding should be implied. Since there is no finding of 
entitlement necessary to support an award of attorney's fees, the 
award should be vacated. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 989. 
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IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS TO VPV. 
If the trial court awarded costs which are not allowed by law, 
this would clearly be a legal error which may be corrected by this 
court. The standard for awarding deposition costs is fairly clear 
and straight forward. The deposition must be "essential to the 
development and presentation of the case." Morgan v. Morgan, 795 
P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) . This means that the case must be so 
complex that discovery cannot be completed through less expensive 
means. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 
507, 512 (Utah App. 1988) . 
VPV's only justification of the depositions was that they were 
necessary to "lock in" the testimony of the main players. VPV does 
not explain why it needed depositions to "lock in" the testimony of 
its own witnesses, Martell and Owens. It seems that taking the 
deposition of one's own witnesses is really not essential to 
complete discovery. Therefore, at least the costs of the Martell 
and Owens depositions should have been denied. 
Even assuming that "locking in" testimony is a valid goal of 
discovery, VPV presents absolutely no explanation why requests for 
admissions or interrogatories would not have adequately "locked in" 
the testimonies of Hartmark and Gardner. The simple fact of the 
matter is that VPV wants to shift the hard costs of bringing its 
own lawsuit onto Hartmark. If the tests set out in Morgan and 
Lloyd' s are to have any meaning, then the award of deposition costs 
must be reversed. 
- 22 -
X. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORAL FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT ITS 
RULINGS. 
Hartmark is not claiming that the trial court erred by not 
making written findings, although they certainly would have been 
helpful. Hartmark is claiming that the oral findings made by the 
trial court are inadequate to support the rulings made. 
As is evident from the many questions raised by Hartmark, the 
trial court did not provide detailed findings in order to set forth 
the steps of the court's analysis. Adams v. Bd. of Review of the 
Industrial Comm. , 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) . If it had, many of 
the issues raised on appeal would not have been raised. 
Inasmuch as Hartmark protested the inadequacy of the findings 
below, and VPV stridently argued that they were sufficient, any 
deficiency in the findings should now be resolved in favor of 
Hartmark. Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988) . 
No findings should be implied by this court in order to uphold 
any of the trial court's rulings in favor of VPV. To do so would 
allow VPV, who drafted the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, to invite error by omitting detailed findings, 
and then benefit from that error on appeal by claiming that the 
omitted finding was favorable to its position. Hartmark should not 
now be penalized for doing all that he could to correct the 
inadequacy of the trial court's findings in a timely manner. 
If the trial court had actually made the requisite subsidiary 
findings regarding the basic facts which are missing in this case, 
it may have realized that its initial rulings were wrong. 
- 23 -
See Adams v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Comm. , 821 P.2d 1, 
(Utah App. 1991) . 
XI. HARTMARK'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS BASED UPON PRESERVING 
THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
VPV misconstrues Hartmark's request for attorney's fees. 
Hartmark is simply preserving his claim to attorney's fees in the 
event he prevails on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court misconstrued and misapplied the law to the 
facts of this case when it ruled that the general release was 
invalid. The entire judgment should, therefore, be reversed, and 
the matter returned to the trial court for consideration of 
attorney's fees, both below and on appeal. In the alternative, 
each award should be reversed for the respective reasons set forth 
herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of June, 1995. 
SMITH & HANNA 
P. Kevin Bond 
Perri Ann Babalis 
- 24 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify on the C^^ day of June, 1995, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
David W. Brown 
Professional Plaza, Suite 220 
2727 West 3500 South 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Perri Ann Babalis 
PAB\RPLYBRIF.HA7 
- 25 -
